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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
SYLYESTER SCOTT, 
Drfrndant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10876 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Sylvester Scott, appeals from a con-
viction of second degree burglary rendered in Second 
Distrid Court, Weber County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On the 14th day of December, 1966 Sylvester Scott, 
appellant, was found guilty of burglary in the second 
degn--e in Second Judicial District Court; whereupon, 
appellant, on the 19th day of December, 1966, appeared 
for sentencing before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, 
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District Judge. Judge -Wahlquist dc·nied appellant vro-
Lation and sentenced him to the Ftah State Prison for 
thf> indeterminate tt>rm as provided hy law. 
RELIEF SOUC H'l1 OX APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction of second 
degree burglary and a st>tting asidP of t111• sC'nt(•ncc• im-
posed and an ordl·r dismissing tlw conviction and 8Pn-
tence. In the alternativ<' appl'llant 8<'<'lrn the granting 
of a new trial. 
The appellant, Sylv<·st(•r Scott, and one \Yi11imn 
Coleman were charged with :c;('<'ond <lq.;1·(•(• burglary for 
nnlawfnll~- Pnt('ring the 1' and l Fnrnitun· Store in 
Ogden, Utah, with intent to comrnii: lare(·n~- th('n•in. Both 
were fonnd guilty of tlw erirnP elmrgwl. (1'-:2::~. :2-tO) 
From snch a verdict, SylvPster Scott 1H'OS('C\lt("S this 
a p]wal. 
According- to l\Ir. Oar~- Bmrn·ortlt, tl:f• }.fanag('J' of 
the bnrglarizC'd stm·(·, tLrP(' t,·k•vision sd:,; and 01w eoffr(• 
tahlt· disapp(•an·d from tl1<• :-;ton• hd1;('(•n tlH• ('Y<·ning· 
of April ] 8, 1%(i and tlw fol!m•:ing a!'b·rnoon. Somdi11w 
clnring th<> morning of April rn, 1 ~)(i(i, Syl\'<•stPr S('ott, 
who had ]ipf•n to thP ston· SPV(']'al ti1w·s h!'f'ore (T-l<i) 
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Pnkn,d the ::-;tore, with some other fellows, for the pur-
pose of rn•gotiating a contract for a sectional couch. 
~\!though Mr. Scott seemed intent on buying the couch 
(T-34), welt contract, although signed (T-34), was never 
eons nma ted. ( T-1 G) 
-While :Mr. Scott "-as at the store, two men, who 
cnkred with Scott, WPnt into the restroom located in 
an office in the> store. (T-3G) At the end of the business 
da.Y on April 18, 10GG, l\Ir. Bosworth locked the store, 
obst>rving nothing to he missing. (T-71) However, the 
follmYing afternoon ahont 3 :30 p.m. the previously men-
tion('d items \\-ere discovered to be missing and not until 
\Yednesda~-, April 20, the day after the mentioned items 
turned np missing, did l\fr. Bos\\-orth discover that the 
bathroom window scrPen had been removed, (T-58) and 
that a footrnark had bet'n left on a crushed kleenex box, 
sitting atop the toilet tank. (T-57) Mr. Bosworth did, 
however, notice a mnd print on the toilet seat lid the day 
hefore. cr-57) Such evidence regarding the footprints 
was corroborated hy an Ogden police officer, James 
\Yold. (T-134) 
The only evidence connecting defendant with the 
lmrgbry was that of one Copeland Griffin. Griffin, a 
kc·~- witness for the State, had signed an affidavit, (De-
f Pmw exhibit 2 and repeated at T-212) implicating Scott 
nncl Coleman as the participants in the crime and desig-
nating the location of the stolen items. On the basis of 
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the jnformation received from Griffin, a search warrant 
was obtained (T-137) and the police on May 4, 19GG 
(T-138) went to the home of one Carol Jean Craig and 
found a television and a eoffet> table. Cl1-188) Tlws(~ ikms 
were later identified by Mr. Bosworth at the policP sta-
tion as the itrms taken from his storP. 
At trial, Griffin testified (contrary to his affidayit 
us presented in ~\rp;nnwnt I, infrn) tlid utter rd\1sinp; 
the defendants' l'P(llWst to haul sonw fornitnre, lt<' IYPnt 
to the store in qm•stion and ohs<'rYed tlu• dd'r·rnlants 
hauling fnrnitmP from the ston' to th(' ear. (T-(i9, 70) 
rrhe defrndants tlten left and were SPC'l1 again h~- Griffin 
down on 25th Stre<·t at PortNs' ar~d \\'aikrs' in Ogdt>n. 
(T-121) 
CounS('l for defrm;p JH'Ps0ntc•cl two "-it1wssl's, Carol 
.] ean Craig and Anrn•ttc• llollS(', as irnp(·ne11i11g witness<·s 
of Mr. Griffin. Mr. Griffin had ass(•rt<'d that lw had 
nenr sold a t<•lPvis:on to any 1wrson (T-D:3, D~), hnt Miss 
Craig and Mrs. Honse hoth frstifo·d that tliv>- had pur-
ehased a T\T from Ur. Co1wland Griffin. (S<><' rr-178 and 
'11-195 resp<•etiv0ly) Each TY sd imrclias<•d l»- tlw two 
defrns<' witnPSS('S was iclcntifit'd as one• l!k,•ly to haye 
hc•(•n stolc•n. 
Prior to Mr. Griffin's kstiJ\ing against tl1<' <h'-
frndants, conmH'l for each dPfrndunt d1all<·ngecl Urifl'i11's 
eom1wtPney to t<>stif~-. (rl'-<i-1, (i5) By D<·f<·nsP Exhihit No. 
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and argunwnt of comrnel it was pointed out that Cope-
land U riff in, following a charge against him for grand 
lare('ny was found !€'gaily insane and committed to the 
lltah State Hospital in November, 1962. Mr. Griffin 
rn·nr stood trial on the charge of grand larceny, rather 
he was released from the Utah State Hospital after his 
condition had improved and pled guilty to the reduced 
charge of pett)' larceny. (Defense Exhibit No. 1) At no 
t imc• 1rns a dPtennination made as to Griffin's return to 
sanity, and the sentencing court even asserted that Grif-
fin could be returned to the State Hospital for further 
tn•atnwnt at the hospial's request. 
On tlw basis of Griffin's prior insanity history, de-
frnsP counsel objected to Griffin's testifying. Such ob-
ject!on was based upon the fact that he was at one time 
adjudged incompetent to stand trial and no termination 
order of his insanity having at anytime been rendered, 
Griffin was therefore, incompetent to testify. (T-64, 67) 
The trial judge, after asking several questions of Griffin, 
relating to present circumstances, found him competent 
to testify; his sanit)' was to be a matter for jury con-
sidPration. (T-64, 67). 
ARGt'"l\fENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
PERMITTING COPELAND GRIFFIN TO TESTIFY 
AT TRIAL WITHOUT DETERMINING HIS ABILITY 
TO COMPREHEND AN OATH AND TO RECALL 
AND RECOLLECT FACTS. 
6 
The fact that a person has heen adjudicated insane 
will not, alone, disqualify him as a ·witness in a trial. 
State v. Moori.so11, 259 P.2d 1105 ("\Yasl1. 195:3) ~ lYat-
bns L Watkins, 245 P. 2cl 4:1-± (Okin. 1952). FnrthPr, 
it is generall.\- h1,ld to hP within il1<· discrPtion of tlw 
trial judge to dt'tt>rrnin<' whdh<>r a penwn, who has 
he0n adjudicat('d insane is corn1wtent to testi f"y. ,'Nate 
v .• ~loorison, supra; lVatki11s r. lVatki11s, s111;ro. Ilow-
Pver, if a iwrson lias hP<'n adjrnlicafrd insaiw, a prP-
snrnption arises that he is total!:· in<·omJH't<•nt as a 
witnc>ss. Stafl' 1'. Petlw11d. s:12 P. 2d Hl!l2 C\Yash. 1958) 
Becanse Copeland Griffin's insanit_,. determination had 
never heen revoked, it was neePssary that his eompdeney 
to testify he adeqnately Pstahli:-d1<'d. Stl('h \\·as, hcrn-enr, 
never don0. 
Under Utah law "[a]ll iwrsons, without exe<>ption, 
.. who, having organs of sens<', can iwrc·<'iY<', and per-
ceiving, can make knm\-n tht>ir iwrei'ptions to otlwrs, may 
lw witnesst:'s." Utah Code Ann. ~7S-:2±-l (rn:>:-3) llow-
rvrr, hy Utah Code Anotat0d 78-24-2 (l) (1!)58), "[t]hose 
who are of nnsonnd mind at thP time of their production 
for examination," cannot he witesses. Angnwnting tlH' 
rules ahove cited, ·with r<'SJH'Ct to th<' ahility of a wihwss 
of nnsonnd mind to kstif.\- is State L Ifrrrin[J, 188 S.\V. 
Hi9 (.Miss. 191G), in which tlw C'ourt at 174 asserted: 
(a) That a person of unsound mind is eom-
rwt(•nt as a witrn,ss, if (1) upon <·xamination ]tp 
h(' fo1 1nd to 11" of suffiei<•11t rn<·ntal (•apaC'it:· to 
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understand tlw nature of an oath - that is, to 
know it is hoth a moral and a legal wrong to 
sw<'ar falsely, and that false swearing is a punish-
able aim<> in law, and (2) if he be possessed of 
sufficient mind and memory to observe, recollect, 
and narrate the things he saw or heard; (b) that 
la"·fnl ronfirn·mPnt in an asylum for the insane, 
or an adjudieation as an insane person, creates 
a prima faeic· presumption of absolute incom-
pdenc>- as a witness; hut ( e) such presumption 
i:-; rehnttable by the voir dire examination of 
tlw \Yitnl:'ss alone, or when aided by extrinsic 
<·videne<•; and ( d) the burden of rebutting the 
presumption of incompetency in case of confine-
ment in an as>·lum or adjudication as an insane 
person is on him who offers the witness; but ( e) 
that absent such confinement, or adjudication as 
an insane person, the bnrden of showing incompe-
tenc>' on account of unsoundness of mind is on 
him who objects on that ground. 
fiurh rnlPs have also been recognized m State v. 
Petlw11d, 332 P.2d 1092 ("Wash. 1958), and State v. Moor-
isun, 259 P .::!d 1105 ( 'Vash. 1953). 
From tlw record it is clear that Mr. Griffin was 
adjudicated insarn~ and that such insanity determination 
was rn•nr tenninatlJd. (See Defense Exhibit No. 1) 
Wlwrefore, it was incumbent upon the trial judge to 
detnrn i rw or upon tlw vrosecutor to show, not withstand-
rng tlw insanity finding: 
(1) that Griffin was capable of understanding the 
natun• of an oath, that is, it is wrong to swear falsely 
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and (2) that he possessed sufficient mind to ohset--V(', 
recollect and narrate thjngs he saw and heard. 
When Griffin was offer0d as a witiwss dd{'nSt' oh-
jected on the grounds of his adjudicatf'd insanity. 'J.'ht• 
judge then examined Griffin as follO"ws at ( T-GG-G7) : 
THE COURT: Cope, tell me \\·here yon are? 
A. In OgdPn. 
THE COURT: \Vhere ahonts in Ogden? 
A. In the conrthonse. 
THE COUHT: \Vhat arr \\"<• doing! 
A. Having conrt. 
THE COURT: \Vho is on trial? 
A. Sylvester Scott. 
THE COURT: \Vhat is }i(' charged \vi th! 
A. \Vho, him? 
THE COURT: Mr. Scott. 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
A. Burglar)'. 
THE COUHT: \\That day of this wPek is it, 
do yon know? 
A. Tuesday. 
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THE COURT: Can you tell me about what 
time of day it is 1 
A. No, I can't. 
THE COURT: Give me your best idea, what 
time do you think it is 1 
A. I would say about two-ten. 
THE COURT: Can you see that clock in the 
back, up there, on the back wall 1 It's a pretty 
hard clock to see. Will you walk down there and 
trll me what time it is1 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Can you see it from here or 
do you want to walk down there1 
A. Yes. CW alking closer to the clock). 
THE COURT: ·what time is it? 
A. Two-thirty. 
MR. NEWEY: Now then, for the Record, 
would the Court take judicial notice of the fact 
that the clock on wall doesn't show two-thirty. 
THE COURT: Twenty-nine and a half. 
MR. PHILLIPS: Would, Your Honor m-
qnire of the date and year1 
THE COURT: What year is it? 
A. Sixty-six. 
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THE COURT: Do yon happen to know the 
date? 
A. No. 
THE COURT: ·what month 1s it? 
A. Decc>mber. 
THE COURT: Do you know the day of the 
month it is~ 
A. No, I don't 
It will be rPadily apparent that thP questions rPlate 
to Griffin's prest>nt situation only. No qlwstions wer(• 
asked Griffin which would reflect his ability to undPr-
stand an oath nor to rt>colll·ct aernrat('ly. ThP onl:-.· n-frr-
ence bearing on Griffin's oath is at T-lGG >dH'rP tlw 
following takes place: 
THE COURT: Qualify him as to memory as 
to yPst0rday's oath. 
An examination of the r<'cord fails to diselose that 
Griffin was (•wr asked whdh<>r hP understood tlw clnty 
of an oath. 
Although thP trial jndgP has it within his cliscrdion 
to determine wlwthPr a iwrson a(ljudieated insan<' has 
snffici<mt capacit~- to testify, the trial judge almsPd that 
• 
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discretion b.v failing to determine Griffin's capacity to 
nnch•rstaJHl an oath and r0collec·t acrurately. 
Tliat Griffin was incapable of either understanding 
an oath or recollt'cting past events accurately or both, 
is ohviom; from the nmuerons inconsistencies found in 
his stat('lt!Pnt. Griffin s1,·ore an affidavit to the police 
'' liich led to the charging of the defendants with the 
crime• of second degree burglar)·. Griffin's affidavit, 
,,·hi<'li was n0nr alte>red by Griffin (T-212) read as fol-
lows: 
A. On about the 18th of April or the 19th, 
19GG, Binky Colc•man and Sylvester Scott came to 
t!tc• honw of my sister, Irene Turner' at about 
30th and vVall. They asked me if I would haul 
sonH' fnrnitnre from the store in South Ogden. 
I asked Scott how he got in the store. Sylvester 
told me that he had gone into the store before 
thP store had closed and opened the window in 
tlw restroom. I told the two that I would not 
go with them, so they got another fellow to go with 
them. I took my girlfriend and we went out and 
parked it a little ways from the store and watched 
Binkv and Svln•ster go into the store and come 
ont ~,·ith a t~levision and table. 
The table was a long table and the television 
was a light colored one. I watched them for about 
20 minutes. The~v took the things they had and 
wC'nt to Sylyester's home. They took the things 
into the h~s0mcmt of Sylvester's home. I saw this 
stuff at Sylvestt•r's home the next day, Sylvester 
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had one of the televisions and the table using it 
upstairs .... (T-212) (A slight variance between 
Defense exhibit No. 2 and the record at T-212 
should be noted.) 
At trial Griffin's testimony varied substantiall~· and 
importantly from his affidavit, as below listed: 
1. Irene Turned was no Griffin's sister (T-78) 
but he asserted she was, both in his affidavit 
as well as on direct examination. (T-68, 212) 
2. Griffin stated he never asked the defendants 
how they got into the store. (T-69) 
3. He asserted he only saw two boys present at 
the store. (T-89), hut his affidavit im·olved 
three. 
4. The gfrlfriend who was supposed to have 
accompanied Griffin was identified as Daisy 
Mae Bush (T-217); however, when she was 
called, she denied having been with Griffin on 
the evening of the alleged burglary. (T-222) 
Also, an examination of Griffin's trial testi-
mony seems to indicate he was alone at the 
time he allegedly observed the burglary. (See 
specifically T-95) 
5. Griffin asserted that he newr saw the fellows 
go in - only come out of the store. ( T-89, 113, 
119) 
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G. Clriffin stated that he did not know where 
8,\'lvestPr 8cott was living in April or May 
( T-7::q, .\Td he ·was adamant in his affidavit 
that th<' ddendants went to Scott's home, and 
placed the things in his hasement. 
7. Furtlwr, at trial, Griffin claimed that when 
thP dPfrndants left, he turned around to follow 
them, bnt did not see them again for twenty-
fiw to thirty minutes. vVhen he again saw the 
<kfendants, they were coming out of Porters' 
and Waiters' on 25th and vVall street and the 
car involvPd in the bnrglary was parked on 
25th. ( '1'-121 ) A ft er seeing the defendants and 
the car on 25th Street, Griffin went home. (T-
122) Consequentl,\r, Griffin never saw the de-
ft>ndants ])lace the itt>ms in any basement. 
It should abo he noted that Griffin never saw 
the def Pndants around the suspect car, but con-
rlnded thr def<>ndants must have committed 
thv hurglary because of the way the defendants 
wore their hats, and also, because the car was 
present. ( T-12::l) Griffin corrected his testi-
mon.\' at T-131 and indicated he also recognized 
thP de>fendants at the storP. 
8. Griffin testifird that he saw the TV and coffee 
tahlP at Carol Craigs home three or four days 
(T-101 ), or sPveral days (T-71) after the burg-
larY. Whrrefore, Griffin did not see the items 
at Scott's place the next day, as alleged in his 
affidavit. To claim Griffin may have mistaken 
tlw home of Carol Jean Craig for that of Syl-
vester Scotts', to attempt a reconciliation of 
J1is affidavit with trial testimony, will not hold; 
then Oriffin. at trial, indicated Scott may have 
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hePn living on Childs, ( T-73) yPt Carol J Pan 
Craig was id0ntified by him as Ji,·ing at 32nd 
and \Vall AvPnne. (7-71) 
An examination of tlw inconsist0ncies lwtwt>Pn Grif-
fin's story as told on l\Iay 4, 19GG, about two \WPks afkr 
the burglary, and his testimony at trial on DPcember 13, 
19GG (T-1) evidences eitlit•r that Griffin was incapahlP 
of observing and accuratPl~1 rPcollecting past en•nts or 
that he did not understand tlw natnn• and importanc<' 
of an oath to kstif\ trntlifully, or hoth. Certain]~· som<> 
inconsistent statements on th<> part of a witnPss may be 
excusable due to laps<' of tiuw, hut Oriffin's testimony 
at trial was so substantially divt>rsP from hi::,; affidavit 
that time alone would lw no <>xcn::,;(•. 
·without qut>stion, Griffin, with or without his nwntal 
condition, could not recoll(•ct tlw l'Wnts inYoh•ed and/or 
did not know the meaning of an oath to tdl the trnth. 
Because Griffin had hePn adjudicafrd immm>, without 
heing rt>nderc·d sane at tlw time of trial, under law he 
was presumed totally inr0111pentent as a witness, and tlw 
burden was upon the Jll'O:-:(•ention to n•lmt sueh prP::,;mnp-
tion, or upon the judge to Pxamine Oriffin as to his 
ability to know and undl'rstand an oath and to ohsPl'\'(', 
recollect and narrate thP things he saw or }ward. Stat<' 
1·. Herri11q, s11JJrrl at lRS; S!'(' State r. />et711nul, Sll/Jrll. 
1'hP court's allowing <lrifi'in to t<':-:til'y following a 
rneagPr examination of tlw witn<'ss, wliirh Pxamination 
im oh·<·d 0111~· his fll'<'sPnt awaren<'ss, was Prror, and 
;1n ali11,.:<· of' disC'r<'tion. Since Griffin had been adjudi-
cat<'d i11san<· tl1<' trial conrt should have examined Griffin 
to d<'tnmirn· his eapa<'ity to understand an oath and to 
1 .. c<ill<Tt, not silllply hav<> asked questions relative to his 
l ir<'sc•nt eapacit:-·. 
ARGUMENT 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY ON THE LAW OF ACCOM-
PLICE AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED §77-31-18 IN THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT SAID INSTRUCTION. 
l·tnli Law relating to the testimony of an accomplice 
1s l!nd<'r ~17-:n-18 Utah Cock Ann. (1953), as follows: 
:\ conYidion shall not be had on the testi-
rnnn>· of an accompliee, nnlPss he is corroborated 
h_,. otli1•r <·vicknc1>, which in itself and without the 
aid of the t<•stimon:-- of the aecomplice tends to 
cmrn<·d the defrnclant "·ith the commission of the 
ofl"rns<': and tlH• eorroboration shall not be suffi-
C'iPnt, if it lllPr<'l>· shmYs the commission of the 
offrns1• or the eireumstances thereof. 
Tl1<· <·,·id<·m·<· proclne<'d at trial by the defense, if 
lH·li<·nd, rnnld have t>stablished that Griffin was an 
H<·1·0111pli('<' in tlH• erilll<' all<'gedl>· committed by the de-
i'P11dants, mid his tPstirllon>· would thl'TI have necessitated 
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corroboration to com'ict thP d0fendants. Utah CorlP Ann. 
~77-31-18 (1953). 
At trial Griffin assPrt<>d that althongh he rt>fuS('d 
to help thP defendants hanl tlw fnrnitnrP from U & I 
Furniture Store, (T-G9) ht> 1wvt>rtlwless, watclwd tlw 
defendants remove the fnrnitnr<> from the store, and 
threfore knew that a crime was heing co1111nittPd. ( T-G9, 
70) Allegl'dly the crime occurr<>d in th« morning of tlw 
19th of April. (T-17, 19, 71) Yd, aceording to th<> t<>sti-
mony of Carole .foan (l\IoorP) Craig, Copeland (lrit'fin 
appeared at her home and offrn•d to sPll her a t<>l<'vision 
set, a coffe table and a earpet on April El, or ~O. (T-177, 
l 78) The TY set was lat1•r id<'ntifi<>d as tliP OJl(' tak<-11 
from the U & I Furniturt> ~ton• hPhn•<'n the 18th and 
19th of April. (Cf. T-1:)8 \\·lwr<> .James \\'old disco\·PrPcl 
the T\T at Carole J(•an Craig\; IJonH• afh>r sw<'aring 
a warrant on Griffin's affidavit.) (T-11()-B8) Also l\[r. 
Bosworth i(kntified that T\T at tlw station ( T-~O) and 
matched the S(•rial number at trial. ( T-5:), G-1) Furthur, 
according to Annl'tte Hons(', slw also bought a T\- from 
Griffin ahont two months latPr, ( T-195) which TY abo 
rPsemhl<>d, according to Bosworth, on<> takt>n from tht-
storP. ( T-221) 
A logiral conclnsion from the p\·idvne<> giv<>n is that 
if Griffin did not actnall>· ean>· th<> fmnitim· 011t of tlw 
store, he did in fact know that the furniture had ht><•n 
stolen, and knowing sueh did tlwn·after I'<'C<'iV<' such 
pro1wrty to sPll tlw smn<>, and sueh ff('(•ipt was irnmt>d-
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iait>ly aft<'r tlte commission of the crune. '\Vherefore, 
1q1oll tlj(• <·\·id(·nc1· in·c'sl·ntd, it would not be unreasonable 
10 c·o11<·lmk that (lrjffin in fact was an accomplice to the 
hmglar;. in tl1at lH· was JH'<'S<'nt wlwn tlw crime was being 
c·01mnith·d, was awan• of its commission, and aidrd and 
alwttt-d i11 it C'ommission hy disposing of the fruits of 
tlil· nirnP. His tPstimo11~·, lH'ing the only evidence which 
eonrn·<·t(•d tlw defrndants to the hurglary, would not, 
undn ·; 77-:11-1 S s11 pport a convietion of the defendant, 
~('Ott . 
. \ Utah Case, \rlti<·h might seem contrary to the posi-
1 ion clairn<·cl h>· dPfrndant is that of State v. Bowman, 
~;2 F tah :-i-±0, 70 P .2(1 458 ( U>:J7). However since the 
( \·idPnc<· sliowl'd tlia (J riff in was in recent possession 
ol' tlw stulrn goods with personal knowledge of the alleged 
nirn1·, np1 wllant cont('nds that this case is distinguishable 
frolll tlint or St11tl' /'. Br11/'IJ/(1JI, supra as Pxplained below. 
Jn tlH· Bow111a11 casl', s1111rn, ddrndant appealed his 
<·01widion of liurglar>·· 01w Hartman, aftPr pleading 
gnil1y hi1w;elf, tt•stifiP<l against Bowman alleging they 
Lotli '"·n1· inYohwl in tlw crimP. Following the burglary 
tltP dl'i'<'rnlauts eontact<'d on ·w erz, and asked him to 
ston· sOlll(' l><n1·d mPrcliandise for them. '\Verz' testi-
111on>· \\as us1•<l to eonoborafr that of the accomplice 
llartman. 1'la· qw•stion of wlietlir·r \Verz '\Yas an accom-
1 ii i(·1· \\'hos(• frstirnony neP(ll•d eorohoration, was left to 
th .it~l'_\'. On .~\pJH•al (kfrndant elainwd the trial court 
·:l1nnld k1\·1· r11J<.d as a mattl•r of la\\· \\'Prz was an accom-
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plice. In rejecting the ddendant's position the court 
specifically points ont that the tPstimony did not show 
vV <:>rz in fact knew a C'rim0 had bern COlllllli tted when he 
accepted the stolen property. 
Appellant submits that Utah has adopted the posi-
tion that an accessory after the fact i;.;; not an accomplice, 
(State 1). Bowmau, supra at 54G, 70 P.2d at 4<il); ratlu-'r, 
an accomplice, whosP kstimony rn'(•cls f'orrohoration 
under W7-:)l-18 Ftah Code Ann. (1!J;J:1), is 01w ·who 
is cnlpahly implicated in the c01111nission of th« C'l'illl\' 
of which thP d(•l<'ndant is a<'C'llsPd, (State r. !Jowmr111, 
supra at 548 70 P.2d at -Hil), or 01w who conld lH' C'har,ged 
as a principal ·with Hw dt•frnclant on trial. State v. nucic, 
1:21Utah184, 186, 240 P.2d 2(i3, :2G4 (1952). App(-'llant, 
howPn·r, C'ontends that heC'anse thP Pvid\'nce shows Grif-
fin >ms close]>- related to tlw erinw, tlw jnry shonlcl haw 
lwen given the dnt>- to ddenni1w mH1<·r Jll'OJlPr im;trnc-
tions wlwther Griffin was an acco111plict' or principal, 
and if tlw affirmatin lw found, that a com·ietion could 
he rendered only if his kstimony WPI'l~ indepeml<•ntly 
co1Tohoratcd. 
Appellant realizes that no instruction n•garding an 
accomplice was ei tl1t•r 111adP or n'qnPstPd, and such foil-
11r0 rnav hP ad<'<1uat<> grounds to rPjt'ct tli(• pn·::ot>nt argu-
nwnt. State v. Hall, 112 F. 272, JH() P.2d ~)70 (1!)-17). 
Howev<'l', it is pro1wr for an amwllat<· court to eol'l'l'd 
<nor~' at trial witlt l'PSp<·d to i11-.;tn1dions. Ci'. Stote r. 
Waid, ~J2 Ftal1 2!.17, :~O!l, (;/ J>.~\l fiJ7, (i:l2 (l!J:37). Further, 
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tlw casP ahow cit<'d of Stole 1:. Hall is distinguishable 
1'10111 tlH• irn;tant casP on the basis that in the Hall case 
tlw eonrt found snffi<'i<'nt eorroborating evid(~nce existed 
to cm1'.·id tl11· d1·frrnlant. In the im;tant cas(~ before the 
conrt, tl1(• only testimony offon•d hy the State, other 
than tliat of Griffin's \\·as that offen~d by Mr. Bosworth, 
th<' r & l rnmrngn alHl .Ta1ll<'S \Vold, the Ogden policeman. 
~\n exarnination of the tPstimony of both men indicates 
t1nly 1lmt a ('rime liad been committPd; only Griffin's 
1• :-;tim011.\· implieates the dt>frndants. Corroboation which 
1111•n•l>· shows that a erirne has hP1•n committed or the 
l'ir('11111:-;hrnl'Ps t111·n·ol' is insufi'icient as corroborating 
nid<•JH'I'. rtah CodP Ann. 77-31-18 (1953). 
BPcause the freedom of defendant is involved in this 
rn:-;1" tlw tl)l]H'Jlant as;;.;erts that it was the duty of the 
trial conrt to instruct the jury with regard to the law 
of aeeomplice and permit the jnr.\· to pass upon whether 
tli<' sbtc>'s witnPss \\·as in fact an accomplice whose testi-
111on)· of w•cv:~sit)· lwd to lw corroborated. Such failure 
con st itnfrd l'rror 1m·jrnlieial to the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For tliP n·asons ht>r!'tofore stated, appellant respect-
fo 11.\· :-.:ubrnits that tliP eonviction and sentence for burg-
lary in tlH• s<•coml degTP<' renckred against him should be 
1TY<·rs1·<l nml dismissPll. Altnnatively, appellant would 
~uhmit thnt a rn•w trial slionld be grankd. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
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